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Abstract
We use a within-subjects experiment with math and word tasks to show that feedback about
relative performance moves high ability females towards more competitive forms of compensation
such as tournaments, moves low ability men towards piece rate and group pay, and eliminates
gender differences in choices. We also examine choices for females across the menstrual cycle, and
find that women in the high-hormone phase are more willing to compete than women in the low
phase, though somewhat less willing to compete than men. There are no significant differences
between the choices of these groups after they receive relative performance feedback.
Introduction
Economic experiments have shown when given the choice between piece rate and winner-take-
all tournament style compensation, women are more reluctant than men to choose tournaments
(e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). These gender difference experiments have all relied on a
framework where subjects were not informed of their abilities relative to potential competitors. We
use a within-subjects design and replicate these previous findings for a math task, and show they
also exist for a word task. We then show that feedback about relative performance moves high
ability females towards more competitive compensation schemes, moves low ability men towards less
competitive schemes such as piece rate and group pay, and removes the average gender difference
in compensation choices. We also examine between and within-subjects differences in choices for
females across the menstrual cycle. We find that the relative reluctance to choose tournaments on
the part of women comes mostly from women in the low-hormone phase of their menstrual cycle.
Women in the high-hormone phase are substantially more willing to compete than women in the low
phase, though still somewhat less willing to compete than men. There are no significant differences
between the choices of any of these groups after they receive relative performance feedback.
In low information settings the effects of gender and menstrual phase are large. A female has
a 0.14 lower probability of choosing a tournament compared to a male, even when controlling for
performance and confidence. For a female to be as likely to choose a tournament as an average male
she must believe she is 40% better than average in performance. We find that the within-gender
menstrual phase effect is larger than the across-gender effect. Females in the low-hormone phase of
their cycle have a 0.16 lower probability of choosing a tournament than females in high-hormone
phase. A low phase female must believe she has 50% better performance to be as likely to compete
as a female in the high-hormone phase.
Without feedback, high ability females and males are both more reluctant to enter tournaments
than expected value maximization would require. This effect is larger for high ability females. On
the other hand, too many low ability types enter competitive environments, and this effect is larger
for males. Relative performance feedback moves all these groups toward more optimal choices. This
result suggests that the behavioral differences in the willingness to compete are driven less by stable
preference differences than by differing reactions to the generally poor information concerning a
person’s relative rank.
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One motivation for experiments on gender differences in competitive behavior comes from the
job market where many careers involve a tournament aspect. An example of this is the corporate
ladder, where females make up a small portion of top-level executive positions. Bertrand and
Hallock (2001) found that in 1997 the fraction of females in top level management positions was
3% and only 15% of firms had at least one female in a top level executive position. There are
many potential explanations for this underrepresentation. Discrimination is one explanation, the
effect of traditional family roles and raising children on women’s career choices and human capital
investments is another (Polachek 1981). Part of this underrepresentation may be caused by a
preference by females against competitive, tournament-like situations in favor of alternatives – or
by a preference by men towards competition and tournaments.
Such a preference difference could have many causes. For example, Jirjahn and Stephan (2004)
argue that the attractiveness of piece rate schemes for females is likely caused by reduced wage
discrimination in such a setting, when performance can easily be measured. It could be for this
reason that firms with a higher proportion of females are more likely to offer piece rate compensation
(Brown 1990).
Another explanation could be a differential performance increase during competition. Gneezy,
Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) find that females see lower performance gains from participating in
competitive environments. Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) also find that this gender difference exists
at a young age; by observing children’s performance in running races, they find that competition
increases the performance of boys, but not girls. These differences in performance seem tied to
the gender of competitors. Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) also find that in mixed-gender
competitive environments males have significant performance increases when an environment is
made more competitive, while females do not. However, when females compete only against other
females, their performance increases as the environment becomes more competitive. Gupta, Poulsen
and Villeval (2005) find that females are more competitive when given the opportunity to choose
the gender of a potential competitor. Specifically, females are more likely to choose to enter a
tournament if they first choose to be paired against another female before making the tournament
entry decision. These results suggest that the gender composition of groups may play a role in
performance gains from competition, as well as in the selection into competitive environments.
Overconfidence could be another explanation, but Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that the
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gender difference remains large even after controlling for the relatively larger overconfidence of
men. Dohmen and Falk (2007) report similar results.
Different preferences for risk and ambiguity are another possible explanation. In most compe-
tition experiments the subjects have very little information about their relative ability when they
make their competitive choices. They typically learn their own performance in trial runs, but not
the performance of potential competitors. Grossman and Eckel (2003) provide a review of gender
differences in risk preferences and find that results generally, but not always, find that females are
more risk averse than men. However, most experimental studies examining gender differences for
competition argue that gender differences in competitive choices remain after using various controls
for risk preferences. Ambiguity aversion is also a possibility, but ambiguity aversion has not been
found to vary systematically across gender. Moore and Eckel (2003) find that females are more
ambiguity averse for specific contexts and domains, while Borghans et al. (2009) find that males
are initially more ambiguity averse than females, but as ambiguity increases, males and females
behave similarly.
None of the results cited so far show that these gender differences in competitive behavior
are biologically determined. In fact, Gneezy et al. (2009) report results from experiments in
a matrilineal society in India where women are more likely to compete than men in contrast
participants in a patriarchical society performing the same type of tasks. Such a result suggests
that socialization plays a large role in such gender differences. Cross cultural studies of this sort
are one way to isolate the effects of biological factors. In this paper, we use systematic variations
in the levels of hormones for females across the menstrual cycle to examine the same question. We
find that women’s competitive choices vary substantially across the cycle. Interestingly, the effect
is such that during the low-hormone phase of the cycle the behavioral differences are quite large,
while in the high-hormone phase females choices to compete are similar to those of males.
Hormones have been found to affect various economic behaviors in humans. The hormone
oxytocin has been found to increase trusting behavior of individuals (Baumgartner et al. 2008).
Fehr (2009) suggests that due to such results, preferences towards trust are affected by biological
mechanisms. For males, testosterone levels of financial traders in the morning can predict their
daily profits. Cortisol levels in these same traders were found to rise with increased volatility in
their market returns (Coates and Herbert 2008). Testosterone levels are correlated with behaviors
in economic experiments such as offers and acceptances in ultimatum games (Burnham 2007).
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Financial risk taking has also been linked to circulating levels of testosterone in men (Apicella et
al. 2008).
Males and females have very different levels of a number of hormones, including estrogen,
luteinizing hormone (LH), follicle stimulating hormone (FSH), progesterone, and testosterone (Speroff
and Fritz 2005); however, these hormones do not necessarily have the same effects across genders.
Additionally, in a review article Shepard et al. (2009) conclude that the large literature on sex
differences and brain organization indicates that the expression of hormonal effects within a gen-
der may be very dependent on the particular environment under consideration. Women exhibit
large and predictable hormonal variations across the menstrual cycle (Speroff and Fritz 2005).
For females, estrogen and progesterone have received most of the attention in studies examining
behavioral effects.1
The mechanisms by which hormones affect behaviors are explained by neuroendocrinological
research on how hormones alter brain activity. Results show that major depression may be linked
to reduced density of serotonin binding sites (Malison et al. 1998). By injecting estrogen in rats,
Fink et al. (1996) find that estrogen stimulates an increase in the density of serotonin binding sites
in certain areas of the brain, including the anterior cingulate cortex, anterior frontal cortex and
the nucleus accumbens – areas that have been linked to the anticipation and receipt of monetary
rewards (Fink et al. 1996, McEwen 2002, Bethea et al. 2002, Platt and Huettel 2008). Progesterone
has been shown to inhibit neurotransmission, and as a result it may decrease anxiety and increase
sedation (Vliet 2001). Other research suggests that progesterone may decrease the degradation
rate of serotonin (Bethea et al. 2002).
Sex differences in the brain develop during perinatal development where both females and
male brains are organized differently from different exposure to steroid hormones (Gagnidze and
Pfaff 2009). For female rodent brains, estrogen masculinizes aramatase-expressing neural pathways
and also masculinizes territorial behavior (Wu et al. 2009). Aromatase is an enzyme that converts
testosterone to estradiol. In the adult male brain testosterone acting through androgen receptors
is necessary to complement male type behavior (Gagnidze and Pfaff 2009). For females, estrogen is
required and received by estrogen receptors to express male-type aggressive and territorial behavior
in mice (Gagnidze and Pfaff 2009). Thus, estrogen for females may lead to similar behavior for
females as that induced by testosterone in males. Dreher et al. (2007) uses fMRI to assess brain
1Estrogen is the generic term for this hormone, estradiol is the form that is most often measured in humans.
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activity during the anticipation of uncertain money payments, across different phases of the men-
strual cycle. While the study does not include decisions, they find significant changes in activation
in areas related to the processing of rewards (such as the striatum) and in the amygdala, an area
that activates during fear and anxiety.
In this study, we exploit the large variations in estrogen and progesterone levels that occur in
females over the menstrual cycle. As shown in Figure 1, both progesterone and estrogen remain
low during the early part of the menstrual cycle. This first week of the cycle is when normal
cycling females menstruate and can be considered a low-hormone phase. The later part of this
is called the pre-follicular phase. Estrogen then rises quickly and spikes just prior to ovulation
– this is referred to as the follicular spike. After ovulation (approximately day 14 in the graph),
during what is called the luteal phase, females who ovulate experience heightened levels of both
progesterone and estrogen. This second spike in both hormones may be referred to as the luteal
spike or high-hormone phase (Speroff and Fritz 2005, Stricker et al. 2006). Testosterone levels
also vary over the menstrual cycle, peaking just before the follicular estrogen spike (Sinha-Hikim
et al. 1998). However the spike is much smaller than for estrogen, and testosterone levels are
insignificantly different during menses and the luteal spike.
Figure 1: Hormonal Fluctuations in Normal Cycling Females
These are median values from Stricker et al. (2006)
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Only a few studies have examined the economic effects of the menstrual cycle. Ichino and
Moretti (2009) use detailed employee attendance data from a large Italian bank and find that
absences for females below the age of 45 tend to occur according on a 28-day cycle. These 28-day
cycle absences explain about one-third of the gender gap in employment absences at the firm. The
female menstrual cycle is approximately 28 days and they focus on females below the age of 45, who
are more likely to be pre-menopausal. In an experimental study, Chen et al. (2010) explore the
possibility that menstrual cycle phase effects drive bidding differences between males and females
in auctions. They find bidding differences in first-price auctions, with females in the low hormone
follicular phase bidding more than females in the high hormone luteal phase, though most of this
variation is found to be driven by contraceptive users. In direct contrast, Pearson and Schipper
(2009) find that women bid more than men, and earn lower profits, only during the menstrual and
premenstrual phases of the cycle when estrogen and progesterone levels are lower. There is one
experimental study looking at competitive choices and the menstrual cycle, Buser (2010). This is
a between-subjects study of choices of females to compete in all-female groups, and it finds that
females participating during predicted high levels of progesterone tend to be less competitive. We
compare these results with ours in the discussion section.
Not all economic studies have found support for hormonal effects on economic decision making.
Zethraeus et al. (2009) examine 200 post-menopausal women in a double-blind study. Participants
were given either estradiol (2 mg), testosterone (40 mg), or a placebo daily for a four week period.
Then they participated in an economic experiment session that included a variety of different tasks
looking at risk aversion, altruism, reciprocal fairness, trust and trustworthiness. No significant
differences were found when comparing the behaviors between the three different treatment groups
of females. Some research shows that neural receptors in post-menopausal women may have reduced
sensitivity to hormonal changes, due to the effects of aging (Chakraborty et al. 2003). Such an
aging effect could explain the lack of differences in such a study. Ideally, we would use a double-
blind study using exogenous delivered hormones to examine the effects of hormonal differences, but
such a study is not feasible with pre-menopausal women, since low hormone levels cause bleeding
(Speroff and Fritz 2005).
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1 Experimental Design
We use a within-subjects design with sessions about 2 weeks apart. An online pre-screening survey
was used to recruit and schedule subjects for experiment sessions. We limited the sample of females
to those using a monophasic hormonal contraceptive or not using hormonal contraceptives at all.2
For normally cycling females, the sessions were scheduled during a low-hormone phase (days 2 to
7 in Figure1 ) and a high-hormone phase (days 18 to 25 in Figure1 ) of the menstrual cycle. These
high and low phases are supported by research examining a drop in hormones during menses (Aden
et al. 1998). We intentionally avoided the estradiol spike around day 14, because of its short
duration and variability within and across females. Other phases were also avoided due to greater
measurement error about the hormone changes that could be occurring during those times. Thus,
we limit our study to examining the greatest contrast in hormones for females by using a scheduling
design that has been successfully used in the field of neuroscience (Fernandez et al. 2003).
Females using a hormonal contraceptive experience suppression of endogenous hormone pro-
duction when in the active phase of their contraceptive regimen (Speroff and Fritz 2005). Both
progesterone and estrogen levels remain fairly constant as the body receives a daily dose of hor-
mones exogenously (Aden et al. 1998). During the placebo or non-active phase of the contraceptive
regimen, there are no exogenous hormones being provided to the body; this withdrawal leads to
withdrawal bleeding (Speroff and Fritz 2005). Since menstrual bleeding is caused by low hormones,
this allows for easy identification of the low-hormone phase. We scheduled contraceptive users
and normal cycling females accordingly, so that both would be in the experiment during a low-
hormone phase and during a high-hormone phase. The high-hormone phase coincides with the
luteal spike for normal cycling females and a stable elevated hormone phase for contraceptive users.
We avoided the follicular spike, because it is short and difficult to time and therefore difficult to
correctly schedule subjects into sessions.3
Using the screening survey, females were first randomly scheduled during a predicted high or
predicted low-hormone phase. Men were simply scheduled for two sessions about 2 weeks apart. To
help minimize errors in classifying phases correctly, we also used an exit survey. The low-hormone
2Monophasic hormonal contraceptives, release the same level of exogenous hormones each day for the entire non-
placebo phase of the hormonal contraceptive regimen. We excluded users of biphasic and triphasic pills, with varying
daily hormone doses.
3Ovulation occurs twelve to forty-eight hours after the follicular peak is detected. Ovulation prediction kits capture
this rise in hormones; thus, using such kits would not be helpful or cost effective.
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phase is easily identified by the presence of withdrawal bleeding (in both normal cycling females and
those in the placebo phase of contraceptives). The high-hormone phase is more difficult to pinpoint,
particularly for subjects not on contraceptives, because of variability in the cycle. Rather than just
asking the females that showed up for a session the date of their last or expected next menstruation,
we focused on scheduling across two specific hormonal phases to minimize identification error, as the
menstrual cycle has a large degree of variability, and females may have trouble accurately recalling
and predicting menses (Crenin et al. 2004). The combination of pre-screening, scheduling, and the
exit survey were designed to address this.
Previous studies on differences in competitive choices have used between-subjects designs (Niederle
and Vesterlund 2007, Gneezy et al. 2009). In our within-subjects design each subject participated
in one session of math tasks, and another of word tasks. We used two different tasks in part because
we wanted to minimize behavioral spillovers from the first to the second session, and in part because
it is generally believed that females may view themselves as having worse math skills than males
(Niederle and Vesterlund 2010). For this reason females may be less likely to compete in math
tasks than in word tasks. This design is the first to examine whether there are stable differences in
competitive choices across genders between-subjects and within-subjects for math and word tasks.
Subjects were randomly assigned to start with a math or a word based session. In each session
tasks were performed for five different treatments, one of which was randomly chosen for payment
at the end of the experiment. Each treatment lasted 4 minutes. In the first treatment participants
performed the task under a non-competitive piece rate compensation scheme, where pay was en-
tirely dependent on the individual’s own performance. In the second treatment, participants were
randomly assigned to a winner-take-all tournament with a size of two, four, or six competitors. This
second treatment provided participants with experience in a situation where their pay depended on
their own performance as well as the performance of others. In the third treatment, participants
performed the task with a group pay (revenue sharing) form of compensation. This treatment
randomly paired participants and payment for the group’s total production was split evenly. This
third treatment can be considered the least competitive because of the possibility of freeriding. It
can be shown that given some random assignment of competitors or group members, this design
should lead low ability individuals to choose group pay and high ability individuals to choose a
tournament.4
4A model justifying such predictions is provided in Appendix C.
8
In the final two treatments subjects were able to choose between piece rate, group pay, or a two,
four, or six person tournament. Before the fourth treatment, subjects were told their own absolute
performance from treatment 1, but were not told anything about the performance of others. Just
before the fifth treatment, participants were shown how all individuals in the session had performed
in the first treatment with their performance highlighted, and they then chose their compensation
method and performed the task again.
The math task was similar to the one used in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). Participants
were asked to add four randomized two-digit numbers and complete as many of these summations
as possible in 4 minutes. Equations were presented to participants on a computer screen and they
typed in their answer and pressed the Enter key or clicked a Submit button on the screen. After
each submission participants were promptly shown the next equation to solve, using scratch paper
if they wanted. On the screen, the equations looked like the following:
12 + 57 + 48 + 52 =
The word task was similar to that used by Gu¨nther et al. (2008). In this task participants are
shown a letter on a computer screen and have four minutes to form as many unique words as possible
that begin with that specific letter. The letter remains on the screen for the entire four minutes and
participants enter in their word submissions in a text box below the letter. The attempted word
formations are then listed below the text box to help subjects minimize duplicate answers, since
these are counted as incorrect. Common place names (cities, countries) are acceptable, but proper
names are counted as incorrect. Plural and tense changes to root words are counted as separate and
correct answers as long as these words still begin with the appropriate letter. In the experiment,
participants were informed of the rules before beginning the task. All participants were informed
that everybody in the same session and same treatment received the same letter, thus a task of
equivalent difficulty for all participants in each treatment.
The word list used for grading words is a common English word list used by open source word
processors.5 We used a restricted group of letters for this study to limit the variation of difficulty
between treatments and sessions (e,f,g,h,i,l,n,o). Between 2.7% to 3.8% of all words in the word
list began with these letters.
5Spell Checking Oriented Word Lists (SCOWL), Revision 6, August 10, 2004 by Kevin Atkinson.
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For the piece rate compensation, the payoff an individual receives is equal to the piece rate
multiplied by the production of the individual for that particular treatment. Payoffs for both the
math and verbal tasks were calculated in a similar manner though the base rate was different for
word formation tasks ($0.25) and math addition tasks ($0.50), to adjust for generally higher per-
formance in the word task. In a tournament, if an individual has the best performance in his group
then he receives the piece rate multiplied by the size of the tournament, multiplied by his individ-
ual performance. If an individual does not have the best performance in his tournament then he
receives nothing. In the event of a tie, the individual receives a fraction of the tournament winnings
based on the number of individuals he tied with. Subjects were not informed about whether they
won or lost a tournament until all five treatments were complete. After each treatment, and before
seeing their score, subjects were asked how well they thought they did and how well they thought
the average person in the session did, and they were paid for having accurate predictions.
Subjects were told that they could be randomly grouped with people that did not necessarily
choose the same compensation option and that they therefore could be playing under different rules
than their potential competitors or group members. This strengthens the incentive for high ability
types to choose a more competitive tournament, since there is a positive probability that they
may compete against lower ability individuals. This rule also creates an incentive for low ability
individuals to choose group pay, as they may be matched with high ability individuals which would
increase their expected payoffs.6
2 Results
Experiment sessions took place in a computer lab at a large public university, all IRB procedures
were followed. The majority of the 219 participants were university students whose characteristics
are in Table 1. The average size of the 26 sessions was 14.5 participants (with a standard deviation
of 4.15). Sixty-two female and 64 male subjects participated in both sessions. Using the pre and
post surveys we conservatively classified 45 females as participating in a session during a low-
hormone phase of their menstrual cycle, and 34 during both a low and a high-hormone phase. The
word task was used in 12 of the sessions and the math task was used in 14 sessions. Of the 345
individual subject sessions, 165 involved the use of the word task and 180 used the math task.7
6The text for experiment instructions is available in Appendix D.
7One female was removed from the data due to non-compliance with the task instructions.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of session attendees
Participant Characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Age 20.52 2.81 18 33 218
Years PS 2.18 1.48 0 6 217
GPA 3.29 0.47 2 4.1 218
Live Independently 0.82 0.39 0 1 219
Female 0.5 0.5 0 1 219
Meds 0.09 0.28 0 1 219
Characteristics by Sessions*
Low Phase 0.14 0.34 0 1 345
Word task 0.48 0.5 0 1 345
Session Size 14.54 4.15 7 21 345
Second session 0.37 0.48 0 1 345
*126 individuals attended a second session.
Table 2 shows that men and women were similar in terms of age, GPA, years of post secondary
schooling (Years PS) and even have the same proportion taking psychological medication (Meds).
Both genders were assigned to sessions with similar characteristics, except that on average females
were in slightly larger sessions. The session female to male ratio ranged from 0.3 to 2.3 and
averaged 1.01. Thus, all sessions had some degree of gender mix and on average this mix was about
one-to-one.
Table 2: Mean values of individual and session characteristics by gender.
Sex Age Years PS GPA Indep. Meds Word Size Sess. 2
Male 20.70 2.14 3.25 0.83 0.09 0.47 13.79 0.37
Female 20.35 2.21 3.33 0.80 0.08 0.48 15.30 0.36
Total 20.52 2.18 3.29 0.82 0.09 0.48 14.54 0.37
Sessions took place three to four times a week and were held in the morning. Each session
took slightly less than an hour, including approximately 10 minutes at the beginning of the session
during which participants waited together in a foyer. This allowed participants to see that sessions
included both males and females. Once participants entered the lab, partitions were used so that
participants could not see each other’s computer screens or facial responses from the feedback
received. Competition and group memberships were also anonymous.
Payouts were based on one randomly chosen treatment, excluding the flat rate show-up payment,
payouts averaged $7.38 for the math session and $15.01 for the word sessions. Participants who
attended two sessions were later asked to perform a risk aversion task similar to that used in Holt
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and Laury (2002). The risk aversion tasks were performed a few days after the second session to
avoid endogeneity with competition task earnings. A total of 112 participants (56 male and 56
females) participated in the risk aversion task. The average payout for the risk aversion task was
$6.57.
2.1 Task Performance
Each individual participated in five different treatments in each session. For the first three treat-
ments the compensation schemes were as follows:
Treatment 1: Piece rate ($0.50 per sum and $0.25 per word).
Treatment 2: Random sized tournament of 2, 4, or 6 individuals (the winner earned the piece rate
multiplied by the size of tournament).
Treatment 3: Group pay: an individual was paired with a randomly chosen partner and the total
production of the 2 individuals was multiplied by the piece rate and then split evenly.
Table 3: Performance Across Treatments and Gender
Math T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 Word T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
Male 10.9 12.1 12.3 12.7 12.8 Male 38.2 39.4 43.0 45.3 47.0
Female 9.9 11.4 11.8 12.3 12.1 Female 41.0 41.1 45.0 48.4 47.3
Both 10.4 11.8 12.0 12.5 12.5 Both 39.6 40.3 44.0 46.9 47.1
Table 3 shows mean performance by gender over treatments and tasks. The increasing mean
values over the first three treatments in both the math and the word tasks suggest that subjects are
learning to do the task better during the session. There are no statistically significant performance
differences between males and females in either task.8 This lack of a performance difference by
gender, for either task, removes one obvious potential reason for gender differences in choices.
2.2 Gender Differences in Competitive Choices
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Gupta et al. (2005) find that when given the choice between a
tournament and piece rate females are less likely than males to enter tournaments. To test whether
this basic result can be replicated with our protocol, we focus on choices made in Treatment 4.
In those studies, individuals did not have information about their relative performance, and in
8An analysis of the performance effects that occur from learning and different competitive settings are available
on request.
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our study this feedback comes only after Treatment 4. The available choices of group pay, piece
rate, and tournaments of increasing size can be ordered by increasing competitiveness, with sharing
being less competitive than not sharing and larger tournaments being more competitive. In the
figures and empirical analysis we lump the two, four and six person sized tournaments together
though the results are robust when using an ordered scale for tournament size.
Figure 2: Choice Differences Before Feedback, by Gender and Session
Sample size in parentheses.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of choices made by males and females in the first and second
sessions for Treatment 4. The gender differences are large: pooling over sessions we find that only
31% of females chose to compete in tournaments while 54% of males chose the tournaments. The
difference persists for the piece rate: 36% of females chose the piece rate compared to only 20%
of males. These differences are all significant at the 2% level or better with chi-square tests. This
replicates earlier findings, and shows that gender differences for competitive choices are robust to
the addition of a group pay option and different sized tournaments. We also find that, on average,
males and females chose consistently across the two repeated sessions, despite the fact that these
which are often separated by weeks.
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While there are no significant differences in performance between males and females, other
factors such as age and GPA might conceivably affect compensation choices. In this design, we
predict that with full information about abilities individuals would sort according to ability, with the
least able individuals choosing the least competitive environments and the higher ability individuals
choosing more competitive tournaments. Given this we use an ordered probit to test whether the
gender differences in the probability of selections remain after controlling for other potentially
relevant factors.
Table 4 shows that the gender differences persist with these controls, along with the addition
of control variables for confidence, performance, and improvement in the repetition of tasks in a
tournament. Columns 1 to 3 use CompScale as the dependent ordinal variable, where group pay
compensation is less competitive than piece rate which is less competitive than a tournament of
any size.9. In the results, we include both pooled results and random effects estimations using an
ordered probit model. For nonlinear estimations such as ordered probits, random effects models are
often used to deal with the difficulties and bias involved with using fixed effects models (Arellano
and Honore´ 2001). Given that the experiment data is considered a short panel, any fixed effects
estimation of a nonlinear model would also suffer from the well-known incidental parameter problem
that may bias fixed effects results (Greene 2004). For these reasons we chose to use a random effects
ordered probit for estimation purposes.
Table 4 replicates the results of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) with Treatment 4, before rel-
ative performance feedback. Females are less likely than males to enter tournaments, even when
controlling for individual confidence (Confidence (T1)) and relative rank of performance within the
session (%-tile Rank (T1)) from the first treatment. The %-tile Rank (T1) variable gives the rank of
an individual based on her or his performance in Treatment 1 in the session. Using rank allows us to
have the same measure for both math and word tasks.10 Confidence is measured by an individual’s
predicted performance at the end of Treatment 1 (prior to finding out their actual performance)
divided by that individual’s prediction of the average performance of all session participants.11 To
control for performance, we use the relative rank from Treatment 1, but the results are unchanged
when using absolute performance along with an interaction term for word based tasks.
9Our results are consistent with a multinomial logit model and from using ordered probits with rankings that
treat larger tournaments as more competitive.
10Using a variable that measures actual performance with an interaction term for the type of task, gives the same
results as are presented here.
11Females tend to be less confident than males in the math task, but females and males have no significant differences
in confidence in the word task and selection differences still remain.
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Table 4: Ordered Probit Estimates: Choices for No Relative Information Treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled RE RE Risk
VARIABLES CompScale CompScale CompScale
Female -0.36 -0.40 -0.49
(0.13) (0.15) (0.19)
(***) (***) (**)
Confidence (T1) 0.86 0.98 0.99
(0.25) (0.29) (0.34)
(***) (***) (***)
Improve (T2) 0.61 0.72 0.73
(0.20) (0.23) (0.32)
(***) (***) (**)
%-tile Rank (T1) 1.05 1.08 0.85
(0.23) (0.26) (0.32)
(***) (***) (***)
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Risk Controls No No Yes
Observations 343 343 224
ll -336.6 -335.6 -212.3
chi2 66.91 61.00 48.81
Pooled means pooled cross section. RE means that random effects were used.
Standard errors in parentheses. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
As expected, both confidence and the actual percentile rank from the first treatment are posi-
tively correlated with the selection of more competitive environments. Improvement in performance
between the first and second task (Improve (T2)) also has a significant positive effect. These re-
gressions include controls for individual specific characteristics, including the number of years of
college, psychoactive medication, GPA, and age.12 The results are similar when using a random
effects ordered probit, in column 2. Column 3 includes a measure of risk aversion for individuals
that participated in a task similar to the one used by Holt and Laury (2003). We find that this
measure of risk aversion is not significantly correlated with competitive choices in Treatment 4.
The marginal effects (calculated from column 1) show that a female has a 0.14 lower probability
of choosing a tournament than a male, even when controlling for performance and confidence. For
a female to be as likely to choose a tournament as an average male, we would have to increase
her belief about her performance relative to the average by 40%, which is a significant increase in
overconfidence. A ten-percentile improvement in actual relative performance would increase the
12Details on these controls are in the appendix.
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probability of entering a tournament by 0.04. A female would have to improve her percentile rank
by 34% to be as likely to enter a tournament as a male. Thus, these gender differences are not just
significant, but they are also large.
After each treatment, before receiving any feedback, subjects were asked how many correct
answers they believed they submitted. Subjects were paid ($0.25) for each correct answer to en-
courage accurate answers. We create a measure of confidence by dividing an individual’s prediction
of how well he or she did divided by his or her prediction of the session average for that treatment.
Since the average individual should believe they did not perform any better than the session aver-
age, this confidence measure should have a mean of one – in the absence of overconfidence.13 We
could have asked for rank estimates instead of performance estimates, but rank is a poor measure
of the degree of over or under confidence. Consider two individuals that think they are ranked first
in their respective group. One may think that he is 10% better than the average while the other
may think she is 50% better. Both these individuals would be treated as having the same level
of confidence with the rank measure, but one individual is actually much more confident. We use
the measure of confidence from the first treatment because every subject performed the task for
this treatment under the same piece rate form of compensation. This confidence variable provides
the earliest measure of overconfidence before experiencing any feedback or differing experimental
manipulations.
Changes in performance as the experiment proceeds could also change confidence. The variable
Improve (T2), measured as the ratio of the individual’s performance from Treatment 2 divided by
the performance in Treatment, captures the effect of individual improvement between Treatment 1
(piece rate) and Treatment 2 (tournament). There are two possible reasons that this variable should
matter: First, individuals may feel that they improve more than the average individual or that they
were unlucky in Treatment 1 compared to how others would have performed. Second, it may be
the case that individuals become more motivated to put in greater effort because of the competitive
nature of the tournament in Treatment 2. Individuals that improve a lot from competing in such
settings would be more likely to choose to compete than individuals whose performances are not
positively affected by competitive settings.
13We also asked how many correct answers they believed were submitted by the most productive person, the least
productive person, as well as the average number of correct answers, for each session and treatment. We use the
average instead of the prediction of the best or worst individual in the session because it provides a clean measure of
overconfidence. In other estimations, not included here, these measures were separated and variations of using both
the best performance and the worst performance as the denominator were used with little difference in our results.
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Table 5: Gender Effects (Clustered Errors)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES CompScale CompScale
Female -0.35 -0.35
(0.135) (0.114)
*** ***
Confidence (T1) 0.87 0.87
(0.256) (0.246)
*** ***
Improve (T2) 0.62 0.62
(0.181) (0.187)
*** ***
%-tile Rank (T1) 1.04 1.04
(0.227) (0.233)
*** ***
Clusters Individual Session
Risk Controls No No
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes
Observations 343 343
chi2 71.85 116.8
ll -336.5 -336.5
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) found that part of the difference between male and female
willingness to compete was driven by males being more overconfident than females. In their study,
independent of confidence, females had a 0.16 lower probability of entering a tournament than
males. Using our measure of confidence we find that the gender difference is nearly the same, 0.14.
Since we have multiple observations from the same individuals and individuals participate in
the same sessions, we also run regressions where we cluster standard errors on experiment sessions
and then also separately on individuals. Table 5 shows that the results concerning females being
less likely to enter in tournaments without relative performance feedback remain consistent when
using errors that are clustered on the specific experiment session or on the individual. In this table
the dependent variable is the same ordered variable of competitiveness used previously where group
pay is less competitive than piece rate and piece rate is less competitive than a tournament of any
size.
Our within-subjects design includes one session of math treatments and one of word treatments.
Gu¨nther et al. (2010) found that in a maze task, men increased performance in reaction to com-
petitive pressures by more than women did. In a word task the improvements were the same. They
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attribute this to a ”stereotype threat” arising from beliefs that women are not good at the maze
task. This could logically lead to different choices by women to compete, with different tasks. Fig-
ure 3 shows that in our data there is little difference in the selection of competitive environments
by females regardless of the type of task used. We also find little difference in choices by males as
more than 50% of males chose to compete in tournaments in both math and word tasks.
Figure 3: Selection Differences for Females by Task Type for No Information Treatment
Table 6 looks at confidence differences by gender and task. Both genders are overconfident on
average. Males are significantly more overconfident in their math abilities than females, and there
is no significant difference in confidence between males and females in the word task. There is no
significant difference among females between the math and word tasks, while males are significantly
more confident in their math performance than in their word task performance. On average, males
are slightly more confident in their abilities than females. This is partly driven by a few high ability
males who are correct in believing they are better than the average, but overestimate the degree.
For example, the highest level of confidence for a male is 3.38 times his prediction of the average.
His actual performance is 2.29 times the actual session average. Overall, males and females are
fairly consistent in their choices to compete in both types of task: males choose to compete more
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than females in both math and word tasks even though male overconfidence is higher in the math
task. The type of task was not significant in regressions for choices, with or without confidence
controls.
Table 6: Confidence Differences by Gender and Task Type
Task Type Gender Confidence (T1) S.E.
Math Female 1.081 0.030
Math Male 1.209 0.037
Math Both 1.145 0.024
Word Female 1.046 0.029
Word Male 1.039 0.030
Word Both 1.043 0.021
Both Female 1.064 0.021
Both Male 1.128 0.025
Both Both 1.096 0.016
When comparing to Both genders, removing an
outlier makes the gender difference insignificant at a 5% level.
2.3 Performance Feedback Eliminates Gender Differences to Compete
Providing information about the quality of possible competitors might reduce mistakes in competi-
tive choices, but there is no obvious reason feedback should reduce the gender difference in choices,
if that difference is primarily driven by preferences. We test the effect of performance feedback
on choices by providing subjects with an ordered list of the performance of all the participants in
their session from Treatment 1, with their own performance highlighted, before they choose their
Treatment 5 compensation scheme. This provides information about the quality of their potential
competitors, if they choose to enter a tournament.
The two groups of bars on the left side of Figure 4 suggest that females’ choices are barely
affected by information about the performance of potential competitors. The right side of the figure
shows that males’ choices change dramatically. There is a significant increase in the proportion
of males choosing piece rate (5% significance level) and group pay (10% significance level), and
a significant decrease in the proportion choosing tournaments (5% significance level). Comparing
the distributions of men’s and women’s choices in Treatment 4 gives a Pearson chi-square statistic
of 18.79 (p-value: 0.000). After relative performance feedback in Treatment 5 male and female’s
competitive choices are not significantly different (chi-square statistic is 1.91, p-value: 0.385).
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Figure 4: Selection Differences by Gender and Information Treatment (Treatments 4 and 5)
Females (172), Males (173). Sample size in parentheses.
Table 7 shows the results from three different types of ordered probits for Treatment 5 choices,
using the CompScale competitiveness definition from the Treatment 4 analysis. Columns 1 through
3 show, that once performance feedback is provided, there are no significant differences between male
and female choices. Instead, we find that choices are very dependent on the relative performance
information, and on the individual’s improvement from Treatment 1 to Treatment 2. Risk aversion
control variables are not significantly correlated with compensation choices on average; though
risk aversion measures were significant when only examining high ability individuals’ choices in
Treatment 5. The one variable that consistently affects individual choices in Treatment 5 is an
individual’s percentile rank from Treatment 1, a summary statistic of the feedback information
provided before the Treatment 5 choice.
The overall conclusion from Figure 4 and the probits in Table 7 is that there are no significant
gender differences in competitive choices when subjects are fully informed of their relative perfor-
mance compared to potential competitors. In the next section we consider the costs of the selection
differences between men and women when they lack information about the quality of competitors
and whether there are gender differences according to ability levels.
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Table 7: Ordered Probit Estimates: Choices for Relative Information Treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled RE RE Risk
VARIABLES CompScale CompScale CompScale
Female 0.00 -0.02 0.13
(0.13) (0.18) (0.21)
() () ()
Confidence (T1) 0.34 0.44 0.65
(0.24) (0.30) (0.35)
() () (*)
Improve (T2) 0.81 1.01 0.65
(0.20) (0.26) (0.32)
(***) (***) (**)
%-tile Rank (T1) 2.17 2.59 2.31
(0.25) (0.34) (0.37)
(***) (***) (***)
Risk Controls No No Yes
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 343 343 224
ll -320.6 -316.7 -194.5
chi2 110.9 98.51 79.67
Pooled means pooled cross section. RE means that random effects were used
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.4 The Cost of Choices and the Effect of Feedback, by Gender and Ability.
To give some sense of the costs of gender differences in choices, we simplify and assume people
maximize expected payoffs, keep effort constant across compensation choices, and take the choices
and performance of others as given. Table 8 shows the average expected value losses for the
suboptimal selections by males and females in Treatment 4 and Treatment 5.14 Each column
represents the optimal choice that should have been made. The numbers represent the average
expected value cost for choosing something other than that optimal choice. For example, in the
first row under column 6 (for the 6 person sized tournament), the 27.27 represents the average
loss to females whose optimal choice was a tournament of six, but who instead chose a different
form of compensation. The Avg Loss column provides the average loss by gender and treatment.
The average loss of 6.78 in the first row means that females lost an average of $6.78 from their
suboptimal choices in Treatment 4.
14The method used to calculate expected values is based on using the percentile rank as the probability of success
within a tournament.
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Table 8: Selection Losses
Average Loss from Suboptimal Decisions
Optimal Choice
Treatment Gender Grp PR 2 4 6 Avg Loss
4 Female Avg Loss 1.58 2.28 2.91 6.80 27.27 6.78
4 Male Avg Loss 2.42 2.97 2.31 3.29 12.60 4.91
5 Female Avg Loss 0.88 1.88 2.21 5.93 18.70 4.80
5 Male Avg Loss 1.39 1.49 2.02 4.79 10.98 3.95
In Treatment 4, the average expected value loss from selection mistakes was $4.91 for males
and $6.78 for females, a statistically insignificant difference with a t-test. These loss differences
are mostly driven by high ability females choosing not to compete, and to a lesser extent by low
ability males choosing to compete. Column 6 shows that many high ability females (those who
should select a tournament size of 6) are instead selecting smaller tournaments or group pay or
piece rate, at a large cost. The top females lose $27.27 in expected value compared to $12.60 for the
top males. In contrast, low ability males make only slightly more costly decisions than low ability
females, averaging $2.42 versus $1.58 for the lowest types of each gender. We find that high ability
females and high ability males are not entering competitive environments enough. But the high
ability females overwhelming select the noncompetitive environments of piece rate and group pay,
which are very costly decisions. In contrast, too many low ability males are entering competitive
environments, but these mistakes are not particularly costly, on average, because low ability males
would not perform well in the piece rate either.
Table 8 also shows that relative performance feedback decreases the average expected value
losses for both males and females and shrinks the gender gap as well. The decreases in expected
value losses are greatest for high ability females, whose average expected loss fell from $27.27 in
Treatment 4 to $18.70 in Treatment 5, while losses for high ability males fell from $12.60 to $10.98.
Low ability females and males tend to move towards group pay as they get performance feedback.
While a gender difference remains, with low ability males making more expensive mistakes than
women, the cost differences are small.
In Figure 5, we turn to the question of how relative feedback information affects the choices of
high ability females and males. A high ability individual is defined as an individual who should
enter a four person tournament or larger to maximize expected returns from competition. Figure
5 shows that the relative performance information leads to a large increase in the proportion of
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Figure 5: Information Effects for Decisions by High Ability Types
Females (45), Males (50). Sample size in parentheses.
high ability females entering tournaments. Over 50% of high ability females enter tournaments
when given relative performance feedback, which is significantly more than the 31% that choose
tournaments before receiving the performance feedback. In testing for distributional changes, we
find that there is a significant difference in choices for females between Treatment 4 and Treatment
5; using a Pearson chi-square test the level of significance is p = 0.034.
With information, fewer high ability males enter tournaments (12% fewer), but this change in
tournament selection is not statistically significant at the 5% level. The distributional difference of
choices for high ability males coming from information feedback is not significant as a chi-square
test comparing high ability males between treatments produces a level of significance of p = 0.317.
Without feedback in Treatment 4, there is a significant difference in the distributions of competitive
choices between males and females (p = 0.000). After receiving feedback as the level of significance
using a χ2 test is p = 0.158. Thus, relative performance feedback seems to eliminate most of the
differences in choices between the high ability females and high ability males.
Figure 6 shows the effect of relative performance information on choices by low ability types,
where low ability is defined as those individuals with performance below the median in their respec-
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Figure 6: Information Effects for Decisions by Low Ability Types
Females (99), Males (90). Sample size in parentheses.
tive session from Treatment 1. The largest effects are for males. Information drops the percentage
of low ability males choosing tournaments from 43% to 22%, and increases the percentage of low
ability males choosing group pay from 37% to 51%. For low ability males, the difference in the dis-
tribution of competitive choices between Treatment 4 and Treatment 5 is significant at a p = 0.010
with a chi-square test. No such significant difference occurs for low ability females. The distri-
butions of choices are significantly different for low ability females and males in Treatment 4 as
chi-square test lead to a p = 0.054. But in Treatment 5 there are no significant differences between
distributions for low ability females and males.
Information about relative performance moves high ability females towards more competitive
choices and low ability males away from tournaments towards less competitive types of pay. Low
ability females show only a small movement away from group pay towards piece rate. Overall,
providing relative performance feedback information leads to more efficient sorting by both genders.
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2.5 Competitiveness Differs Between High and Low Hormone Phases of Men-
strual Cycle
Normal cycling women experience large changes in hormone levels across the menstrual cycle (Figure
1) and these variations are similar in women using hormonal contraceptives. As explained in the
design section, we used a screening survey to schedule females for one session during a low-hormone
phase and one during a high-hormone phase and exit surveys to confirm phases.
Table 9: Menstrual Cycle Regularity
Regularity of Period Percent Count
Identical 14.3% 55
Within 1-2 days 42.3% 163
Within 3-7 days 34.3% 132
Very Irregular (7+) 9.1% 35
Total 385
Missed Period in Last 3 Months Percent Count
Yes 14.7% 57
No 85.3% 330
Total 387
Numbers may not add up due to item non-response in screening survey.
Table 9 summarizes the screening survey responses of females. Of the females who completed the
screening survey almost 15% missed a menstrual period during the previous 3 months. Over 43% of
these females experienced menstrual cycle irregularity of 3 days or more, suggesting that predicted
menstrual periods may have significant measurement error. Due to the potential inaccuracies
introduced by this prospective survey, we also used an exit survey with both retrospective and
prospective questions on menstruation to classify hormonal phases for our analysis.15
The screening survey also provided information on the proportion of females that use hormonal
contraceptives. Over 54% of females in our sample used some form of hormonal contraceptive in
the form of the pill or ring. This makes for easier predictability of low and high phases for these
females, since hormonal fluctuations are exogenously determined by hormonal contraceptive use.
To help identify hormonal phases for females using a hormonal contraceptive, we asked all female
participants for the start day of their hormonal contraceptive regimen.
15Missed periods are a problem for identification purposes in normal cycling females as they imply that a female
may not have ovulated during that month, and thus did not experience a mid-luteal peak in hormones. Furthermore,
without a recent menstrual period it is difficult to determine the phase in the hormonal cycle.
25
Of the females that participated in experiment sessions, 62.7% of those attending a first session
were following a hormonal contraceptive regimen, as were 62.9% of those at second sessions. The
American College Health Association found that about 72% of sexually active females were using
some form of hormonal contraceptive in 2008 . In examining contraceptive use by females in the
United States, it was found that for women between the ages of 15 to 44, over 82% had at one
time taken oral hormonal contraceptives (Mosher et al. 2004), suggesting that our sample is not
unusual in terms of contraceptive use.
We hypothesize that the low-hormone phase, whether induced through endogenous or exogenous
means, is associated with similar behavioral changes for both hormonal contraceptive users and
normal cycling females. We tested this by controlling for hormonal contraceptive use and found
no systematic significant difference in behavior between hormonal contraceptive users and normal
cycling females. We therefore pool both groups of females and focus on similar differences across
the two hormonal phases.
Figure 7: Competitive Choice by Gender and Hormonal Phase
Figure 7 shows the distribution of competitive choices of females by phase, along with choices
by males, before participants had relative performance feedback. Female behavior is very different
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in the two phases. They are more than twice as likely to choose group pay when they are in the
low phase, and twice as likely to choose tournament when they are in the high phase, though still
not as likely as men. When we include controls in regressions, this last difference will become
insignificant. The data for the histogram includes all females and males that attended two sessions
and all females who could be identified as being in the low or the high phase. Due to the difficulty
of predicting the low phase, some females were identified by the exit survey as being in the same
phase for both word and math tasks. As well, some phases could not be accurately identified and
those subjects are not included in the analyses.
These differences in competitive environment choices across hormonal phases may result from
differences in expected performance changes across the menstrual cycle, or from different preferences
for competition. We find that for the most part, there are no significant performance differences
between females in the low phase and those that are not in the low phase.16 It is also possible
that females in a specific hormonal phase might experience greater aversion to certain types of
tasks; therefore, we separate out these results by math and word tasks. Figure 8 shows female
compensation choices before feedback by hormonal phase and task type. Females that participated
in a math or word task during the low phase were then scheduled for the other type of task when
in a high phase, and vice-versa. The figure shows that the general correlation between competitive
choice and menstrual phase holds across tasks: high phase females are less likely to choose group
pay and more likely to choose tournaments in both word and math tasks.
We use ordered probits to examine the statistical significance of gender and menstrual phase
before feedback, while including control variables. Table 10 uses the CompScale variable, an ordered
categorical variable with choices ranked from group pay, piece rate, to tournament. The first column
provides pooled cross-sectional results including all subjects, the second to fourth columns provide
estimates using random effects ordered probit. The second column includes all males and females,
the third column consists of a female only sample and the fourth column takes into account only
males and females for which risk aversion measures were available.17
We find that females in the low phase select noticeably less competitive compensation plans than
females in the high-hormone phase. In fact much of the average difference in competitive choices
between males and females is driven by the choices of the low phase females. This result holds
even when controlling for confidence. It is worth noting that there are no significant differences in
16See Appendix B.1
17All regressions include controls for session ordering, GPA, age, education, and psychoactive medications.
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Figure 8: Compensation Choice by Hormonal Phase and Task Type for Females.
We are comparing females that attended two sessions.
Sample size in parentheses.
confidence levels between low hormonal phase and high hormonal phase females, and yet females
in the low phase avoid the competitive environments of tournaments and are more likely to choose
the least competitive setting possible, group pay.
These differences could potentially result from discomfort during the low-hormone phase of
menstruation. But females in the low-hormone phase do not behave differently from any other
group once they receive relative performance feedback. Thus, physical discomfort is an unlikely
explanation for these systematic differences in low information settings.
The magnitudes of the marginal effects (calculated using the pooled cross sectional estimates)
of being in the low-hormone phase are substantial and are larger than the average gender effects.
For group pay, females on average have a 0.08 higher probability of choosing group pay than males.
Females in the low phase have an additional 0.16 higher probability of choosing group pay. For
tournaments, females have a 0.10 lower probability of choosing a tournament when compared to
males, and females in the low-hormone phase have an additional 0.16 decrease in the probability
of choosing a tournament.
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Table 10: Ordered Probit: Hormone Effects for No Relative Information (Treatment 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All All Females Only Risk
VARIABLES Pooled RE RE RE
Female -0.26 -0.29 -0.26
(0.14) (0.16) (0.21)
(*) (*) ()
Low Phase -0.44 -0.46 -0.53 -0.76
(0.21) (0.22) (0.26) (0.27)
(**) (**) (**) (***)
Confidence (T1) 0.81 0.91 1.08 0.90
(0.26) (0.30) (0.54) (0.35)
(***) (***) (**) (**)
Improve (T2) 0.60 0.69 0.79 0.72
(0.20) (0.23) (0.38) (0.32)
(***) (***) (**) (**)
%-tile Rank (T1) 0.97 0.99 0.52 0.72
(0.23) (0.26) (0.43) (0.32)
(***) (***) () (**)
Risk Controls No No No Yes
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 328 328 155 211
ll -322.3 -321.7 -156.0 -197.4
chi2 64.32 58.60 19.76 51.31
Dependent variable is CompScale where -1 is group pay, 0 is piece rate, and 1 is a tournament.
The total low phase females that could be identified for data analysis is 45.
Pooled means pooled cross section. RE means that random effects were used.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The changes over the menstrual cycle are also large relative to the effects of confidence and
performance. For a female in the low phase to have the same probability of entering a tournament
as a female in the high phase we would have to increase her belief about her performance relative
to the average by 50%. In terms of an equivalent performance effect, a female in the low-hormone
phase would have to improve her percentile rank by 42% to be as likely to enter a tournament as
a female in the high-hormone phase.
Table 11 shows that the results concerning females in the low hormonal phase persist when
using standard errors that are clustered on the specific experiment session or on the individual for
the no information treatment. In this table the dependent variable is the same ordered variable
of competitiveness that was used previously. The results are entirely consistent with our previous
findings. Although gender may have a prominent role in explaining females’ reluctance to compete
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Table 11: Hormone Effects (Clustered Errors)
(1) (2)
SE Clusters Individual Session
Female -0.25 -0.25
(0.149) (0.137)
* *
Low Phase -0.45 -0.45
(0.200) (0.156)
** ***
Confidence (T1) 0.84 0.84
(0.275) (0.234)
*** ***
Improve (T2) 0.62 0.62
(0.182) (0.187)
*** ***
%-tile Rank (T1) 0.96 0.96
(0.225) (0.227)
*** ***
Clusters Individual Session
Risk Controls No No
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes
Observations 328 328
chi2 69.61 124.6
ll -322.2 -322.2
N clust 215 26
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
in mixed gender settings, it seems that hormonal phase may be a driving factor that needs to be
considered in low information settings.
Interestingly, relative performance feedback makes these cycle specific effects disappear. Table
12 provides the results from ordered probit estimations for Treatment 5, where subjects were pro-
vided with relative performance information from Treatment 1 prior to making their competitive
environment selections. Table 12 shows that when participants are informed of their relative perfor-
mance compared to other potential competitors, then there is little difference in selection between
genders or across the menstrual cycle.
As with the gender differences, we find that after participants are informed of the quality of
potential competitors, choice differences across the menstrual cycle become insignificant. We find
that choices after feedback mainly depend on the relative performance information provided prior
to making the decision and, to a certain extent, on an individual’s improvement from Treatment 1
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to Treatment 2. Though females’ choices to avoid competitive environments are most frequent in
the low-hormone phase, these results suggest that this effect seems to be linked with the information
available about the quality of potential competitors.
Table 12: Ordered Probit: Hormone Effects after Feedback (Treatment 5)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All All Females Only Risk
VARIABLES Pooled RE RE RE
Female -0.07 -0.13 0.10
(0.15) (0.20) (0.24)
() () ()
Low Phase 0.03 0.13 0.12 -0.12
(0.21) (0.25) (0.27) (0.29)
() () () ()
Confidence (T1) 0.23 0.32 0.21 0.54
(0.25) (0.31) (0.53) (0.36)
() () () ()
Improve (T2) 0.76 0.92 1.06 0.49
(0.20) (0.26) (0.40) (0.33)
(***) (***) (***) ()
%-tile Rank (T1) 2.18 2.61 2.63 2.33
(0.25) (0.35) (0.55) (0.38)
(***) (***) (***) (***)
Risk Controls No No No Yes
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 328 328 155 211
ll -307.8 -303.9 -143.3 -183.4
chi2 104.7 93.82 45.89 75.79
We identified 45 females as low phase for this analysis.
Pooled is pooled cross section, RE is random effects.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As discussed previously, there is a cost associated with high ability individuals avoiding compet-
itive settings, and with low ability individuals choosing tournaments. We find that females in the
low-hormone phase make more costly mistakes than high phase females, and males. The average
expected value losses for males, low phase and high phase females in Treatment 4 are shown in Ta-
ble 13. Low phase females sacrifice the greatest amount of expected value from making suboptimal
choices, $8.50. The expected value losses for high phase females and males are $6.52 and $4.91.
The differences between low and high phase females and between males and high phase females are
not statistically significant, but low phase females make more costly choices than males at the 5%
significance level.
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Table 13: Expected Value Loss in Treatment 4
Mean Std. Error
Male 4.91 0.72
Female Non-Low 6.52 1.30
Female Low 8.50 2.57
These results show that menstrual phase and the corresponding hormone levels are correlated
with competitive choices, but only if the strength of the competition is not known. If there is
little information about the relative abilities, then females in the low-hormone phase make more
costly decisions than males and non-low phase females. But there are no significant differences in
expected value losses between genders or between different hormonal phases for females if good
relative performance information is available.
2.6 Systematic Absenteeism, Cancellations, and Tardiness
Absenteeism, cancellations, and tardiness are frequent in experiments, but their effect on sample
composition and results are poorly understood. In this study, because of the screening and exit
surveys, we know some of the characteristics of those who missed a scheduled session, canceled
at the last moment, or showed up late. Our recruiting procedures were designed to ensure we
would observe females during both the high phase and the shorter low-hormone phase. Due to
the variation of the menstrual cycle, it is difficult to predict the low hormonal phase for females.
Using the screening survey, female subjects were scheduled for their sessions according to their
predicted cycle day, calculated using self reported data about the start of previous menstrual
periods. Whenever possible these data were combined with self reported data concerning females’
hormonal contraceptive regimens. Once the cycle day could be predicted, then a set of possible
session days were provided to potential participants and they chose and confirmed a day with a
research assistant. For individuals to be considered as scheduled, they had to confirm that they
would attend a specific session.
Table 14 shows the proportion of participants that attended the experiment sessions as sched-
uled, meaning they were present and punctual. Females are noticeably less likely to show up than
males: 79% of the males showed up as scheduled compared to 68% of females. Based on predicted
phases, only 62% of low phase females attended as scheduled, while high phase females attended
72% of the time. These differences between attendance rates of low phase and non-low phase fe-
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Table 14: Session Attendance After Confirmation
Gender
Proportion N
Male 0.79 217
Female 0.68 243
Total 0.73 460
Females by Predicted Phase
Proportion N
High 0.72 141
Low 0.62 102
Total 0.68 246
males were significant at the 5% level. High phase females were less likely to attend compared
to males, but this was significant only at the 10% level. Since this study was partly focused on
hormonal fluctuations we made attempts to incentivize more low phase females to attend. Part
way through the study, the participation payment of $5 was raised to $10 for low phase females.18
Even with this increase in participation payments a hormonal phase related difference in attendance
remained. This result is consistent with Ichino and Moretti (2009), who found that female worker
absenteeism was highly correlated with the female menstrual cycle.
These attendance results suggest there may be a systematic bias in the hormonal phase of
females who show up to economic experiments in general. Coupled with our evidence of behavioral
differences, this bias should be considered in interpreting the results of experiments that report
gender differences. Additionally, if females who do not show up to sessions are the ones who have
worse symptoms during the low phase, or are more likely to behave differently, then a selection
bias may add a downward bias in the hormonal effects found in this study. Though one should still
note that any such differences are removed with relative performance feedback.
2.7 Robustness Checks
It is possible that during the low-hormone phase females are not as confident in their abilities as
during elevated hormonal phases. Here we show that confidence differences do not explain the choice
differences across phases. Table 15 shows that there are no significant differences in confidence for
females across phases. There are also no significant differences between females using or not using
hormonal contraceptives. Thus, differences in confidence do not seem to explain why females in the
18These females were not told why they were receiving a higher participation payment.
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low hormonal phase choose not to compete without relative performance feedback. We conducted
Table 15: Confidence Levels of Females by Hormonal Phase
Confidence (T1)
Phase Task Mean Std. Error N
High Math 1.068 0.032 58
Low Math 1.041 0.078 23
Both Math 1.060 0.031 81
High Word 1.021 0.031 54
Low Word 1.042 0.057 22
Both Word 1.027 0.028 76
The sample consists of all females
whose phase could be accurately identified.
a variety of robustness checks. First, we checked to see whether the results for gender differences in
competition and differences by hormonal phase remain consistent when clustering standard errors
on experiment sessions and then also separately on individuals. We found that the results of both
the gender and hormonal effects are robust to such error clustering.
Individuals in this study were asked to attend two sessions. Out of 219 total subjects, 126
attended two sessions and 93 attended only a single session. Session composition was random,
sessions contained individuals that were attending sessions for either a first or a second time. The
type of task individuals were using to compete was different for the first and second session, and
the ordering was random. Neither order, the type of task, or group composition in terms of these
measures had significant performance or behavioral effects.
The possibility exists that attendance in the second session was affected by how much subjects
earned in the first session. Individuals that attended only a single session earned $9.36 for their
performance, while individuals that returned for a second session were paid $11.73 for their first ses-
sion performance. This difference in payouts between these groups of individuals is not statistically
significant.
Another possibility is that the value of payment in the first session affects confidence in the
second session. We exploit the random element in the payment scheme and estimate that, con-
trolling for performance, a person who earns $10 more than average in the first session increases
their prediction of their performance relative to the session average by just 4%. Looking just at the
second session females, we find that their confidence in the second session is more sensitive to how
much they got paid in the first session than is that of males. But we find no significant difference
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between females’ and males’ confidence when attending a second session, or across menstrual cycle
phase. Any such difference should in fact make females more competitive in second sessions, but
we find no systematic behavior in this direction.
Table 16: Robustness Check for Gender: Controlling for First Session Payment
(1) (2) (3)
RE RE & Risk RE & Full Info (T5)
VARIABLES CompScale CompScale CompScale
Female -0.40 -0.50 -0.02
(0.156) (0.201) (0.178)
*** **
Confidence (T1) 1.00 1.01 0.53
(0.301) (0.361) (0.309)
*** *** *
Improve (T2) 0.78 0.81 1.10
(0.245) (0.333) (0.276)
*** ** ***
%-tile Rank (T1) 1.08 0.82 2.56
(0.264) (0.333) (0.345)
*** ** ***
First Session Payout 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
* *
Risk Controls No Yes No
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 343 224 343
chi2 65.63 52.89 100.7
ll -333.3 -210.2 -315.6
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
It is still possible that there is an interaction between payments and gender driving choice
differences. Table 16 provides ordered probit estimations to examine whether females are still less
likely to compete when controlling for payments in the first session. Though the first session payout
variable is significant at the 10% level, its inclusion does not affect the significance of the gender
difference of females to avoid competition.
Results seem consistent for both the sample where risk aversion measures were available and
for the sample of participants that did not participate in the risk aversion task. The third column
in Table 16 provides the coefficients from the ordered probit estimation for the full information
treatment (Treatment 5). Again, with feedback we find that gender does not matter in this setting
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Table 17: Robustness Check for Hormones: Controlling for First Session Payment
(1) (2)
RE RE & Risk
VARIABLES CompScale CompScale
Female -0.29 -0.27
(0.167) (0.212)
*
Low Phase -0.44 -0.74
(0.224) (0.275)
** ***
Confidence (T1) 0.95 0.94
(0.306) (0.366)
*** **
Improve (T2) 0.74 0.77
(0.245) (0.328)
*** **
%-tile Rank (T1) 0.98 0.68
(0.261) (0.329)
*** **
First Session Payout 0.02 0.01
(0.009) (0.009)
*
Risk Controls No Yes
Characteristic Controls Yes Yes
Observations 328 211
chi2 62.07 53.99
ll -320.0 -196.0
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
and neither does the payout from the first session. Thus it seems that the gender difference for
competition in low information settings is not affected by the payment received in a previous session.
We now use similar estimations to test whether the hormone specific results are sensitive to the
inclusion of first session payments. We find no significant differences in confidence or payouts in
the first session between females who could be identified as low phase and the females that were
in a second session and were in the high-hormone phase. The first column of 17 provides ordered
probit coefficients for the entire sample of individuals, including both those that attended a single
session and those that attended two sessions. In this sample, we find that the first session payout
variable is significant at the 10% level, but the effect is quite small. The effect of females being in
the low hormonal phase remains large and significant at the 5% level.
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In the second column in Table 17 we limit the sample to those individuals who participated in
the risk aversion task and therefore attended two sessions. In this sample, while controlling for risk
aversion, we find that the effect of the low hormonal phase is large and significant, but that the
level of the payout from the first session is insignificant. As well, in this group of individuals who
did the risk aversion task, we find that the gender effect is insignificant, but that the effect of the
low phase for females remains significant.
These checks of the effects of first session payouts on second session attendance and behavior
reinforce our conclusion that some of the gender difference in competitive choices is driven by
the decisions of females in the low-hormone phase. The results also confirm that the gender and
menstrual phase differences are only relevant in low information settings.
3 Discussion
We show that the gender differences in competitive choices in mixed gender groups that have been
reported in other studies are robust to a variety of protocol changes, including different tasks and
variations in the degree of competitiveness of the available choices. These gender differences are
stable, persisting in a second session of the experiment performed days or weeks after the first.
This persistence is perhaps more surprising, given that our experiment includes feedback which,
in the last treatment of each session, makes men move away from competition and women move
towards it. In the subsequent session with a different task (words or math), the gender gap for
competition returns– and then goes away again, after the relative performance feedback for that
task is provided.
We also find that female choices to compete vary across the menstrual cycle. In the low-hormone
phase, females are less likely to enter tournaments than during a high-hormone phase. These
differences in competitive choices also become noticeably smaller and statistically insignificant
after subjects are provided with feedback on their relative performance. Thus, both the gender
difference as well as differences to compete by females across different phases of the menstrual cycle
are removed with relative performance feedback. We show the change comes from high ability
females moving towards more competitive environments and low ability males moving towards less
competitive choices.
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The fact that information removes any significant differences in competitive choices has im-
portant implications. First, this result suggests that the decision not to compete by females may
be more affected by the informational environment and the ambiguity of relative abilities than by
any persistent preference for or against competition. Second, since females in the low-hormone
phase are less willing to compete than females in the high-hormone phase, this suggests that the
hormones linked with the phases of the menstrual cycle may be affecting areas of the brain that
help evaluate the rewards and risks associated with these competitive tasks, as suggested by the
findings of Dreher et al. (2007).
Progesterone has been found to decrease reported anxiety (Vliet 2001) and elevated progesterone
could therefore reduce the disutility of worrying about the outcome of a competition– particularly
before feedback information. Estradiol has been found to increase the density of serotonin binding
sites in areas of the brain that are linked with evaluating rewards (Fink et al. 1996). Females may
experience greater sensitivity to potential rewards during elevated levels of estrogen, which could
lead them to be more competitive (Stanton and Schultheiss 2007). Thus, our results are consistent
with previous endocrinological studies on hormones and behavior.
Our finding that women’s competitive choices increase during a part of the menstrual phase
when progesterone and estrogen are high is noticeably different than the result reported in the only
other economics paper to look at this issue. Buser (2010) finds that when females compete against
other females, females in menstrual phases with high levels of progesterone are less competitive.
One major difference between our studies is that we use mixed-gender groups. Other studies
have found that female competitive behavior in single gender groups is very different from that
in mixed gender groups, with females being much more willing to compete when the group is all
female (Gupta et al. 2005, Grosse and Reiner 2010). Being in a same gender group may promote
the effect of progesterone on group affiliation motives reported in Schultheiss et al. (2004). As
the gender composition experiments show, competitive decisions are context dependent, and the
neuroendocrinological literature (Anders and Watson 2006) emphasizes that the behavioral effects of
hormones are also context dependent. Thus, the gender composition of the particular labor market
being examined may interact with the effects of hormones and relative performance feedback.
Another difference is that we use a within-subjects design, which is particularly important in
examining the effects of hormonal variations that are inherently within-subjects. A final difference
between these studies is that our study includes a larger number of female subjects in both high and
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low-hormone phases. One potential disadvantage of the within-subjects design is that experiences
in the first session might affect choices in the second. We use two different tasks, with the session
order randomized to minimize this problem, and we show the results are robust to order and tasks.
The existence of regular and predictable within-subjects variation in behavior across the men-
strual cycle suggests that there is a biological component to the gender difference in competitive
choices – but not a simple one. We cannot conclude hormones explain the male female differences
– there are too many other things that vary across genders. Instead, we show that biology drives
differences in behavior for individual women, across time. This raises many interesting questions
for optimal choice. Women who know that they are subject to this variation might well take steps
to increase or decrease their competitive choices by changing when they make decisions involving
competition, such as job choices and college applications.
Interestingly, hormonal contraceptives allow for control of the timing of the low-hormone phase,
and in fact, there is no medical reason for the low hormone (placebo) phase of the hormonal
contraceptive regimen (Anderson and Hait 2003). As a leading textbook on clinical gynecological
endocrinology states: Monthly bleeding, periodic bleeding, or no bleeding– this is an individual
woman’s choice (Speroff and Fritz 2005, pg 908). It has been suggested that the placebo and
withdrawal bleeding was a marketing effort to make the birth control pill seem less novel and more
acceptable(Coutinho and Segal 1999). Females can entirely avoid hormonal fluctuations and the
low-hormone phase by sustained contraceptive use, and some forms of contraception such as the oral
contraceptive Seasonale, now eliminate the placebo phase and ensure that the low-hormone phase
does not occur (Anderson and Hait 2003). If the decrease in hormones affects females decisions in a
costly manner then there is an incentive for avoiding this phase; hence a further reason the existence
of a market for sustained contraceptives. Of course, our results also show that such manipulation
would only matter when there is poor information about ability relative to potential competitors.
Since information about relative ability removes all behavioral differences across the menstrual
cycle and between genders, it would be natural to suggest that the differences in competitive choices
might be the result of differences in overconfidence. But we find gender differences in competitive
choices in both math and word tasks. In the word tasks, confidence levels of females and males are
the same and a gender difference in choices persists. In the math task the gender difference persists
even after controlling for confidence. The information about relative abilities may help subjects
form more accurate beliefs about the possibilities of succeeding in competitive situations, but since
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females hold similar overconfident beliefs as males in word tasks, we would expect females to choose
in a similar fashion as males. Instead, females choose not to compete in low information settings,
irrespective of confidence or the type of task.
Another possible explanation for the differences in choices across gender with and without
feedback would be a gender difference in risk aversion. However, when we control for risk aversion
the gender difference in choices still remains in the uninformed treatment. Furthermore we find
risk aversion is not significant in explaining competitive choices in the full information treatment.
Another explanation that would be consistent with our results would be a gender difference in
ambiguity aversion. Little research has been done on gender differences in ambiguity aversion and
the results are mixed.
Firms, governments, and schools sometimes implement affirmative action policies to encourage
females to apply for competitive jobs and scholarships. Affirmative action policies typically focus
efforts on recruiting females or changing the acceptance or promotion process to favor females.
Niederle et al. (2009) report on experiments showing that affirmative action can encourage com-
petition by females with low efficiency costs. The performance feedback condition result from our
study suggests an alternative to affirmative action – providing better information about relative
abilities.
We find that information on relative ability plays a large role in choices to compete. Information
reduces gender differences, reduces differences across the menstrual cycle, and improves sorting by
ability. Schools and many large firms already collect relative performance rankings about students
or employees (Pfeffer and Sutton 2006), and our work suggests that making these rankings more
available to these agents and emphasizing relative comparisons will promote an environment where
the best workers, both females and males, will seek out more competitive positions.
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Appendices
Appendix A (Not For Publication): About controls
A number of control variables were used in this analysis including whether a subject was attend-
ing a first or second session, or a word based session, neither were ever significant. Also, other
individual characteristic control variables such as the number of years of post secondary schooling,
age and GPA were included, but were never significant with the exception of number of years of
post secondary schooling, which was negative and significant. In estimations not included here
categorical dummy variables were included for the majors of students, but none were significant
and were removed due to their irrelevancy.
The other set of controls that are not listed are measures controlling for risk aversion. After
participating in both a math and word session, subjects were invited to participate in a Holt and
Laury (2002) task a few days after the competition experiment sessions. These risk aversion sessions
were done separately so as not to affect behavior in the competition task. Consequently, the sample
of these individuals is slightly different from the other specifications, but the results remain fairly
consistent. The risk aversion coefficients were not found to be significant in the treatment with no
relative information feedback.19 The only specification where these measures are significant is in
the full information treatment for a limited sample of high ability individuals. The fact this measure
does not significantly predict behavior in the no information treatment is intuitive as individuals
have little information regarding their probabilities of success; thus, beliefs may matter more in
such situations than risk preferences. Since risk aversion is significant for high ability individuals
in the full information treatment; this result suggests that risk appetites matter only to individuals
that have higher returns from making an optimal choice. For those individuals of low ability, their
expected value is higher by avoiding the tournament regardless of risk preferences.20
Three variables that are used and presented in the tables include, Confidence (T1), Improve
(T2), %-tile Rank (T1). These variables deserve further explanation as they are measuring some
very relevant factors in the individual decision making process. In other estimations, variations of
these variables were used, but these variables provide the cleanest and most intuitive interpretation
possible and results remain consistent with other possible measures of the same factors.
19For brevity these results are not included in this discussion, but are available upon request.
20There were no significant gender differences for risk aversion in the sample.
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Appendix B (Not For Publication): Performance
The main focus of this paper is on the compensation choices that individuals made in the exper-
iment; however, these choices may have been affected by performance differences. This section
focuses on task performance for the different treatments. To consider how individuals are affected
by the different incentives of each type of compensation, we focus on the performance of individuals
in the first three treatments. In these first three treatments, individuals had no choice over the
type of compensation they received for their efforts; thus, the performance effects from different
compensation environments are exogenously determined.
According to the theory of piece rates and tournaments, one would expect greater effort for a
higher piece rate. Similarly, an individual of higher ability and higher probability of winning should
increase effort in a tournament. As the tournament gets larger and more competitive, one would
expect that individuals would increase effort or set their effort levels to zero. Before considering the
effects of tournament size on effort, we first focus on possible order effects and gender differences
between treatments.
The regressions in Table 18 are used to consider gender differences in performance, learning
effects and the incentive effects of increasing tournament size. The performance in the word task,
but not the math task, is highly correlated with the GPA of participants. Regression estimates for
both word and math show an order effect suggesting that subjects are learning in the first three
treatments. Regression 1 in Table 18 shows that the tournament size has a statistically significant
positive effect on individual performance in the math task. Increasing the competitiveness of a
compensation environment from the piece rate to a tournament size of 6 should increase performance
of an individual by 0.65 problems in a four-minute task. This is an increase of 5.7% for the average
individual. In columns 2, 4, and 5, categorical variables are used to investigate whether tournament
size is actually leading to the increase or whether just competing against someone in a tournament
of any size leads to performance increases.
In the second column in Table 18, categorical variables were used for each of the possible
competitive environments, for group pay and for tournaments. To test whether the tournament
size matters a separate dummy variable, Tourney (ts>1) was used to identify if an individual had
to compete against someone else. This categorization created a separate baseline for tournaments
consisting of six individuals. Once controlling for tournament competition it was found that the
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size of the tournament does not matter and that group pay performance is not significantly different
from the piece rate environment in the math task. There is also a positive effect for age as the
average effect of a year of life leads to an increase in performance in the math task of 0.5 problems,
though this may be offset by further post-secondary schooling. It is worth noting that overall
the competitive environment and individual characteristics explain very little of the variation in
performance for the math task in terms of goodness of fit measures such as R2.
The results from the word task (Regressions 3 and 4) in Table 18 suggest that neither the
tournament nor tournament size increase performance. There is a significant amount of learning
that occurs with each treatment. GPA has a significant positive effect in terms of performance.
This likely occurs because an individual’s vocabulary expands with age and individuals with a
higher GPA probably have richer vocabularies than individuals with lower GPAs. More of the
variation in performance can be explained in regressions using the word task than the math task;
this mainly stems from the inclusion of control variables for the random letters used for each task.
The math task results suggest that being in a tournament does increase performance, but the size
of the tournament is irrelevant. One might expect that only high ability individuals would increase
performance from the incentive effects from being in a tournament, but we find the opposite. In
splitting the sample for high and low ability individuals, according to their performance in the first
task and whether they are above or below the median, we find that the low ability individuals
increase performance in response to being in a tournament (significant at 1%) in the math task.
We find no significant effects from tournament size for high ability individuals in the math task.21
The competitiveness of the environment has a significant impact on performance only in math
tasks and once an individual is participating in a tournament, then the number of competitors
does not lead to further performance benefits. Competitive environments (tournament size) had
no influence on the performance of individuals in the word task. Thus, depending on the type of
task, competition between individuals may increase performance. Therefore, due to mixed results,
one cannot conclude that tournament size increases performance or effort of agents.
Overall, we find that a more competitive work environment may not lead to performance in-
creases as the incentive effects of competitiveness are not robust across different types of tasks.
Another important result shown by these regressions is that there are no significant performance
21The estimation results for high ability individuals are not shown here, but none of the competitive environment
variables were significant in these estimations.
47
differences between males and females. In terms of performance effects, some learning occurs across
the different treatments and only low ability individuals tend to increase performance when they
are put in a tournament of any size – it is enough to be competing against someone.
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Table 18: RE Performance Regression of No Choice Treatments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Math Math Word Word Low Math
Task Order 0.88 0.82 3.49 3.50 1.10
(0.09) (0.09) (0.39) (0.38) (0.11)
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Tourney Size 0.13 0.04
(0.04) (0.15)
(***) ()
Tourney(ts>1) 0.63 -0.16 1.18
(0.27) (1.02) (0.31)
(**) () (***)
Tourney Size=2 -0.07 2.08 -0.24
(0.38) (1.49) (0.42)
() () ()
Tourney Size=4 -0.21 0.22 -0.73
(0.37) (1.40) (0.45)
() () ()
Female -0.45 -0.46 2.31 2.29 0.44
(0.59) (0.59) (1.87) (1.88) (0.39)
() () () () ()
Years PS -0.50 -0.50 0.16 0.15 0.17
(0.29) (0.30) (0.87) (0.87) (0.23)
(*) (*) () () ()
Age 0.40 0.40 0.33 0.34 -0.07
(0.15) (0.15) (0.49) (0.49) (0.14)
(***) (***) () () ()
GPA -0.26 -0.26 6.60 6.57 0.32
(0.63) (0.64) (1.94) (1.95) (0.41)
() () (***) (***) ()
Letter Controls No No Yes Yes No
Observations 534 534 492 492 303
Number of id 178 178 164 164 101
R-sq 0.0745 0.0721 0.367 0.368 0.196
chi2 102.5 104.5 565.4 570.9 136.0
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix B.1 Performance differences according to hormonal phase.
To examine performance differences across the menstrual cycle, we consider the word and math
tasks separately and estimate effects using linear specifications similar to the ones used to examine
exogenous performance effects of tournaments (Appendix B). Table 19 provides the random effects
OLS estimates for a number of factors that may explain performance differences in both word and
math tasks for all treatments where the participants could not choose their competitive environ-
ments. The estimations for math tasks are in columns 1 to 3 and the estimations for word tasks
are in columns 4 to 6.
There seems to be no correlation with the low-hormone phase and performance in the word task
(columns 4 to 6) for females. The Low Phase coefficient is insignificant for all the different samples
in the word task. Focusing on performance in the math task (columns 1 to 3), there seems to be
no effect from the low phase in the sample of both females and males (column 1), and only females
(column 2). There seems to be some effect for low phase females when including controls for risk
aversion for the portion of the particpants for which such measures were available. On average,
performance in the math task decreases by about 2.2 correct answers for low phase females when
controlling for risk aversion, which is a 20% decrease for the average female. Though the low phase
effect is only significant at the 10% level when taking into account individuals for which measures
of risk aversion can be used as controls. Therefore, if performance or confidence differences are
driving selection differences, then controlling for performance and confidence in a discrete choice
model should help isolate the effect of the low phase on selection choices.
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Table 19: Hormonal Effects for Performance (t<4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All Female Female All Female Female
Task Math Math Math Word Word Word
VARIABLES RE RE RE Risk RE RE RE Risk
Task Order 0.87 0.94 1.01 3.46 3.92 3.09
(0.09) (0.13) (0.18) (0.39) (0.57) (0.70)
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Tourney Size 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.05 -0.03 -0.20
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.16) (0.23) (0.29)
(***) (**) () () () ()
Low Phase -1.07 -1.09 -2.21 2.22 2.09 4.57
(0.98) (0.71) (0.89) (3.00) (2.98) (3.58)
() () (**) () () ()
Female -0.32 1.72
(0.67) (2.11)
() ()
Years PS -0.41 -0.70 -1.19 0.31 -0.87 -3.41
(0.30) (0.40) (0.52) (0.87) (1.39) (2.10)
() (*) (**) () () ()
Age 0.38 0.55 0.89 0.31 1.48 3.52
(0.15) (0.23) (0.27) (0.49) (0.90) (1.22)
(**) (**) (***) () () (***)
GPA -0.12 -0.43 -0.46 5.73 7.56 6.22
(0.65) (0.78) (1.03) (2.00) (3.19) (4.13)
() () () (***) (**) ()
Letter Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Risk Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 510 237 147 471 225 147
Number of id 170 79 49 157 75 49
R-sq w 0.206 0.242 0.248 0.624 0.647 0.665
R-sq b 0.0740 0.147 0.365 0.291 0.340 0.430
R-sq o 0.0909 0.168 0.339 0.369 0.410 0.496
chi2 100.5 62.28 54.45 563.4 289.1 209.3
df m 9 8 10 16 15 17
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix C (Not For Publication): Soting Theory
The goal of the experiment design was to mimic sorting by ability that a firm would want in terms
of having individuals apply for competitive promotions. To do this we use a menu of competitive
choices as a sorting mechanism where high ability individuals choose more competitive compensa-
tion schemes while low ability individuals choose less competitive compensation schemes. First let
us consider a simple piece rate framework. Suppose an individual is paid a piece rate, w, for each
unit of effort, e. Assume the individual has a linear utility function in terms of payoffs, but payoffs
come at the cost of a convex function for effort, where the disutility of effort is determined by θ.
Then an individual’s utility function for working under a piece rate scheme is as follows:
Upr(e) = we− eθ
where θ > 1
(Appendix C.1)
Optimal effort depends on the piece rate, w, and the disutility from effort, θ. This disutility of
effort can be thought of as an ability parameter where an individual with higher ability will have
a smaller θ. The optimal choice of effort using the piece rate is then:
e∗pr = (
w
θ
)
1
θ−1 (Appendix C.2)
An individual that chooses group pay receives half of the output that he provides from his own
effort along with half the output that someone else provides. The amount an individual expects to
get from his group member is the average of all the possible individuals that he may be grouped
with. Thus, in making the decision to choose group pay the individual must consider the expected
utility from such a selection. We will denote the expectation by individual i of others’ (−i) efforts
as E[e−i]. The expected utility from choosing group pay is as follows:
UG(ei) = 0.5wE[e−i] + 0.5wei − eθii
where θi > 1
(Appendix C.3)
In this model the optimal choice of effort under group pay is not dependent on the efforts of others
provide. In essence, if an individual is performing under a group pay compensation scheme, then
the element of potential free riding causes the individual to lower his efforts, regardless of the efforts
of the other group member. Therefore, we can write the optimal choice of effort under the group
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pay compensation scheme in a general form, such as:
e∗G = (
0.5 w
θ
)
1
θ−1 (Appendix C.4)
This optimal choice of effort under group pay is less than the level of effort from piece rate for
individuals of all abilities. Thus, for an individual to choose group pay over the piece rate compen-
sation it must be that the utility from the optimal choice of effort under group pay is greater than
the utility found from the optimal choice of effort under the piece rate compensation. This decision
will depend on whether the expected effort from others, E[e−i] is large enough to dissuade one from
choosing piece rate. This tipping point for E[e−i] falls between an individual’s optimal choice of
effort under group pay and the optimal choice of effort under the piece rate compensation and is
largely dependent on an individual’s ability in the form of his disutility from effort θ. Normalizing
the piece rate to one (w = 1), the value for E[e−i] such that the individual is indifferent between
group pay and piece rate is:
E[e−i] = 2(θ
1
1−θ − θ
θ
1−θ − 0.5(2θ)
1
1−θ + (2θ)
θ
1−θ ) (Appendix C.5)
For an individual with θ = 2, this indifference point is the mean value between e∗pr and e∗G. In
terms of our experiment design, this type of choice menu, including piece rate and group pay, leads
higher ability individuals to choose the piece rate and exert more effort, rather than choose group
pay. Low ability individuals will gain greater utility from choosing group pay and free riding on
someone else’s effort. For these reasons of reduced effort and free riding, along with group pay
being preferred by lower ability individuals, we consider the group pay compensation scheme to be
less competitive than the piece rate. In terms of sorting by abilities between group pay and piece
rate, we can see that in Figure 9 the high ability individual receives greater utility from choosing
the piece rate while the low ability individual receives greater utility from working under the group
pay compensation scheme. In this figure, we assume that the piece rate is equal to two, w = 2.
The non-zero intercept reflects the expectation of the other group member’s efforts, E[e−i] = 1.45.
The other competitive choices in the experiment consist of entering a tournament of different
possible sizes: with a total of two, four or six competitors (including oneself). In this experiment,
along with others like it (see Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), the tournament payoffs differ from
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Figure 9: Utility of Group Pay vs. Piece Rate by Ability
what is found in the standard tournament literature. The standard tournament literature considers
only fixed prizes for tournaments, which by design is meant to deal with difficult to measure output
of workers (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Our payoffs differ and are analogous to the flexible winner
payoffs found in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).
Furthermore, in the experiment output is measurable, but some of the output may be at-
tributable to luck and not effort, due to the precision involved in the task. Output for individual i
can be written as yi = ei+i. One can therefore think of the probability of winning the tournament
for player i, when playing against player j, as pr(ei, ej) = pr(i − j > ej − ei). But if one consid-
ers that the probability of winning a tournament leads to a Nash equilibrium solution with both
individuals providing effort then they both must be of comparable abilities, θ, with comparable
variance in terms of luck, . If the competitors were not of similar ability then the individual with
greater ability, lower θ, could increase his effort and therefore increase his probability of winning
while it becomes more costly for his competitor to do so. The best response of this increased effort
by the lower ability individual would eventually lead to an effort of zero. Such a result would
lead to only the highest ability individual entering the tournament. To ensure that individuals
who choose to compete in a tournament always have competitors, we added an extra element in
the experiment design for individuals that choose to compete in a tournament: if there are not
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enough people for your chosen format, then individuals who have selected another pay format will
be randomly selected to meet the participation requirements for your chosen format.
In terms of expected utility from choosing a tournament, we follow a similar framework as
Eriksson et al. (2009) though we use the flexible payoffs and simply an exogenous probability of
winning. The exogenous probability of winning can be thought of as a function of ability and the
best response towards the expected effort of other competitors. For simplicity, we focus on what
the probability of winning a tournament of a certain size needs to be for a person to see entering
a tournament as being superior to the other options of piece rate and group pay.22
Let n be the size of the tournament, where n−1 is the number of individuals someone competes
against within a tournament. Suppose the exogenous probability of beating an average individual
in a tournament for individual i is equal to pii. The expected utility of competing in a tournament
of any size n such that n ∈ 1, 2, 3, 4, ..., N and an exogenous probability of winning is:
UT (e) = nwpin−1i e− eθi where θi ≥ 2 (Appendix C.6)
This expected utility for tournaments of size n simplifies to the piece rate when n = 1, a tournament
without competitors. The optimal choice of effort for a tournament of size n is as follows:
e∗T = (
nwpin−1i
θi
)
1
θi−1 (Appendix C.7)
Consequently, an individual’s choice of piece rate or tournament size in this experiment largely
depends on her probability of success. In Table 20, we show the minimum probability of winning
against an average individual that is needed to choose a tournament of size n over the piece rate
form of compensation. As a tournament of size n is preferred to the piece rate as long as 1n < pi
n−1
i .
Table 20: Minimum win probabilities for tournament entry
Tourney Size Min. Probability
2
1
2
< pii
4
1
3
√
4
≈ 0.63 < pii
6
1
5
√
6
≈ 0.70 < pii
22Since we have already examined group pay versus piece rate, we focus our attention on tournament versus piece
rate.
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If we suppose that the win probabilities are correlated with abilities such that higher ability
types have greater probabilities of winning then we can expect that higher ability individuals choose
more competitive tournaments. Therefore, in combining the choices of group pay, piece rate, tour-
naments, we have choices that can be considered as ordinal across a spectrum of competitiveness. If
one does not, believe that these categories can be considered competitiveness then one can consider
them as being a type of menu pricing such that subjects should sort themselves by their abilities,
with low ability individuals choosing group pay, followed by the next highest ability individuals
choosing piece rate, followed by the highest ability individuals choosing tournaments.
Appendix D (Not For Publication) Experiment Instructions
Appendix D.1 Math Task Instructions
General Instructions
In this experiment you will be performing a task five different times. The task will consist of having
you solve 2-digit 4-number addition problems in a 4 minute period.
The addition problems will look similar to the following equation:
12 + 57 + 48 + 52 =
In some cases, you will be asked to make decisions about how you will potentially be paid for your
performance.
Only one of the five tasks will determine your payout for the experiment and it will be randomly
chosen at the end.
To answer a problem, you will simply type the numbers on the keyboard, then press enter and an-
other problem will appear. You can choose not to answer a question by pressing the Enter button
or clicking on submit. The answer will then be recorded as being incorrect and you will be moved
to the next problem.
To help with time management, there will be a clock counting down the seconds for the 4 minute
duration.
Task 1
For Task 1, you will be paid $0.50 for each correctly answered addition problem during the 4 minute
time limit.
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You will not know how many problems you answered correctly until the end of the 4 minutes.
At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen showing your payout method and
confirming that you understand.
The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Task 2
For this task, you will be randomly placed in a tournament.
The tournament will have a size of 2 or 4 or 6 people, including yourself.
If you win the tournament you will be paid $0.50 multiplied by the number of people in the tour-
nament for each correctly answered problem. For example, if you are in a 4 person tournament
then you will be paid $2.00 for each correct answer so long as you win the tournament.
If you do not win the tournament then you will receive nothing.
In the event of a tie for first place, you will split your tournament winnings evenly with the number
of people that tied for first place in the tournament.
You will not know who you are competing against.
You will not know how many problems you answered correctly until the end of the 4 minutes.
To help with time management, there will be a clock counting down the seconds for the 4 minute
duration. At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen showing your tournament size and
confirming that you understand.
The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Task 3
For this task, you will be randomly put in a group with one other person.
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The group has a total size of 2 people (including yourself) and group members will be paid an equal
amount.
You will be paid according to the productivity of your group. The number of correct answers by
you and your partner will be added together and as a group you will be paid $0.50 per correct
answer. Your group earnings will be divided evenly between each partner ensuring you each get
equal pay.
You will not know who you are a partner with.
At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
You will not know how many problems you answered correctly until the end of the 4 minutes.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen showing your payout method and
confirming that you understand.
The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Task 4
You will now have the opportunity to choose the individual pay rate of $0.50 per correct answer,
or to enter in a tournament, or to join a partner and receive the group pay rate.
Your possible choices are: Group Pay, Individual Pay, 2 Person Tournament, 4 Person Tourna-
ment, 6 Person Tournament
Whenever possible, you will be paired with other people that chose the same pay format as yourself.
If there are not enough people for your chosen format, then individuals who have selected another
pay format will be randomly selected to meet the participation requirements for your chosen for-
mat.
Tournament:
If you win the tournament, then you will be paid $0.50 multiplied by the number of people in the
tournament for each correctly answered problem. In the event of a tie for first place, you will split
your tournament winnings evenly with the number of people that tied for first in the tournament.
If you do not win the tournament then you will receive nothing.
You will not know who you are competing against.
Individual Pay:
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You will be paid $0.50 for each correctly answered problem.
Group Pay:
For the Group Pay format, you will be joining one other person in a group.
You will be paid according to the productivity of your group. The number of correct answers by
you and your partner will be added together and as a group you will be paid $0.50 per correct
answer. Your group earnings will be divided evenly between each partner ensuring you each get
equal pay.
You will not know who you are a partner with.
You will not know how many problems you answered correctly until the end of the 4 minutes.
At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below, you will be taken to a screen to make your payout method choices
and confirm that you understand.
The experiment will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Task 5
Every task that you have done so far has involved no feedback about other’s performance. Now we
will provide you with feedback regarding all session participants’ performance from Task 1.
Your performance: Individual performance.
Everyone’s performance: List of everyone’s performance (high to low).
You will now have the opportunity to choose the individual pay rate of $0.50 per correct answer,
or to enter in a tournament, or to join a partner and receive the group pay rate.
Your possible choices are: Group Pay, Individual Pay, 2 Person Tournament, 4 Person Tourna-
ment, 6 Person Tournament
Whenever possible, you will be paired with other people that chose the same pay format as yourself.
If there are not enough people for your chosen format, then individuals who have selected another
pay format will be randomly selected to meet the participation requirements for your chosen for-
mat.
Tournament:
If you win the tournament, you will be paid the rate of $0.50 times the number of people in the
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tournament for each correctly answered problem.
In the event of a tie for first place, you will split your tournament winnings evenly with the number
of people that tied for first in the tournament.
If you do not win the tournament then you will receive nothing.
You will not know who you are competing against.
Individual Pay:
You will be paid $0.50 for each correctly answered problem.
Group Pay:
For the Group Pay format, you will be joining one other person in a group.
You will be paid according to the productivity of your group. The number of correct answers by
you and your partner will be added together and as a group you will be paid $0.50 per correct
answer. Your group earnings will be divided evenly between each partner ensuring you each get
equal pay.
You will not know who you are a partner with.
You will not know how many problems you answered correctly until the end of the 4 minutes.
At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below, you will be taken to a screen to make your payout method choices
and confirm that you understand.
The experiment will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Appendix D.2 Word Task Instructions
General Instructions
In this experiment you will be performing a task five different times. The task will consist of giving
you an alphabetical letter and having you type as many words as possible that begin with that
letter in a 4 minute period.
To enter a word, you will simply type the word using the keyboard, then press enter or submit. You
will then be able to enter another word. Using an English dictionary, the computer program will
verify that the words you have spelled are correct. Misspelled words will be counted as incorrect
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and will not be included in your task total. During the task, you will see the words you have typed,
but you will not know if you have spelled them correctly.
• Capitalization will not affect spelling.
• Duplicate words will be counted as incorrect.
• Proper names will be counted as incorrect.
• Common place names (cities, countries) will be counted as correct.
• Plurals and tense changes to root words will count as separate correct answers.
Everybody in the session will be given the same letter.
In some cases you will be asked to make decisions about how you will potentially be paid for your
performance.
Only one of the five tasks will determine your payout for the experiment and it will be randomly
chosen at the end.
To help with time management, there will be a clock counting down the seconds for the 4 minute
duration.
Task 1
For Task 1, you will be paid $0.25 for each correctly spelled word during the 4 minute time limit.
You will be informed of how many words you spelled correctly at the end of the task.
At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen showing your payout method and
confirming that you understand.
The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Task 2
For this task, you will be randomly placed in a tournament.
The tournament will have a size of 2 or 4 or 6 people, including yourself.
If you win the tournament, you will be paid $0.25 multiplied by the number of people in the tour-
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nament for each correctly spelled word you enter beginning with the designated letter.
For example, if you are in a 4 person tournament, then you will be paid $1.00 for each correctly
spelled word so long as you win the tournament.
If you do not win the tournament, then you will receive nothing.
In the event of a tie for first place, you will split your tournament winnings evenly with the number
of people that tied for first place in the tournament.
You will not know who you are competing against. Everybody in the session will be given the same
letter.
You will be informed of how many words you spelled correctly at the end of the task.
At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen showing your payout method and
confirming that you understand.
The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Task 3
For this task, you will be randomly put in a group with one other person.
The group has a total size of 2 people (including yourself) and group members will be paid an equal
amount.
You will be paid according to the productivity of your group. The number of correctly spelled
words by you and your partner will be added together and as a group you will be paid $0.25 per
word. Your group earnings will be divided evenly between each partner ensuring you each get equal
pay.
You will not know who you are a partner with. Everybody in the session will be given the same
letter.
You will be informed of how many words you spelled correctly at the end of the task.
At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen showing your payout method and
confirming that you understand.
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The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Task 4
You will now have the opportunity to choose the individual pay rate of $0.25 per correctly spelled
word, or to enter in a tournament, or to join a partner and receive the group pay rate.
Your possible choices are: Group Pay, Individual Pay, 2 Person Tournament, 4 Person Tourna-
ment, 6 Person Tournament
Whenever possible, you will be paired with other people that chose the same pay format as yourself.
If there are not enough people for your chosen format, then individuals who have selected another
pay format will be randomly selected to meet the participation requirements for your chosen for-
mat.
Tournament:
If you win the tournament, then you will be paid $0.25 multiplied by the number of people in the
tournament for each correctly spelled word. In the event of a tie for first place, you will split your
tournament winnings evenly with the number of people that tied for first in the tournament.
If you do not win the tournament then you will receive nothing.
You will not know who you are competing against.
Individual Pay:
You will be paid $0.25 for each correctly spelled word.
Group Pay:
For the Group Pay format, you will be joining one other person in a group.
You will be paid according to the productivity of your group. The number of correctly spelled
words by you and your partner will be added together and as a group you will be paid $0.25 per
correctly spelled word. Your group earnings will be divided evenly between each partner ensuring
you each get equal pay.
You will not know who you are a partner with. Everybody in the session will be given the same
letter. You will be informed of how many words you spelled correctly at the end of the task. At
the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen to make your payout method choices
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and confirming that you understand.
The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
Task 5
Every task that you have done so far has involved no feedback about other’s performance. Now we
will provide you with feedback regarding all session participants’ performance from Task 1.
Your performance: Individual performance.
Everyone’s performance: List of everyone’s performance (high to low).
You will have the opportunity to choose the individual pay rate of $0.25 per correctly spelled word,
or to enter in a tournament, or to join a partner and receive the group pay rate.
Your possible choices are: Group Pay, Individual Pay, 2 Person Tournament, 4 Person Tourna-
ment, 6 Person Tournament
Whenever possible, you will be paired with other people that chose the same pay format as yourself.
If there are not enough people for your chosen format, then individuals who have selected another
pay format will be randomly selected to meet the participation requirements for your chosen for-
mat.
Tournament:
If you win the tournament, you will be paid the rate of $0.25 multiplied by the number of people
in the tournament for each correctly spelled word.
In the event of a tie for first place, you will split your tournament winnings evenly with the number
of people that tied for first in the tournament.
If you do not win the tournament then you will receive nothing.
You will not know who you are competing against.
Individual Pay:
You will be paid $0.25 for each correctly spelled word you submit.
Group Pay:
For the Group Pay format, you will be joining one other person in a group.
You will be paid according to the productivity of your group. The number of correctly spelled
words by you and your partner will be added together and as a group you will be paid $0.25 per
word. Your group earnings will be divided evenly between each partner ensuring you each get equal
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pay.
You will not know who you are a partner with.
Everybody in the session will be given the same letter. You will be informed of how many words
you spelled correctly at the end of the task. At the end of the 4 minutes you will see a screen asking
about your performance.
Do not discuss your performance with anyone else at anytime.
Once you press the button below you will be taken to a screen to make your payout method choices
and confirming that you understand. The task will begin once everyone in this session is ready to
begin.
If you feel like you understand the instructions and are ready to begin then press the ”I understand”
button below.
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